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1. INTRODUCTION  
There remains considerable controversy on the economic impact of TRIPS (interpreted here as 
the tightening of IPRs) in developing countries; needless to say, the new round of WTO 
negotiations adds considerable interest to this controversy. This paper focuses on the long-term 
structural issues concerning the impact of TRIPS on industrial and technology development in 
poor countries. It does not, therefore, deal with such important current issues as the cost of 
medicines, agricultural inputs or genetic materials. Even i n the analysis of technology 
development, it has a limited objective. It seeks to indicate the potential significance of IPRs 
by differentiating developing countries according to the  expected impact of stronger 
protection.
2 It does not measure statistically the strength of IPR regimes or their impact on 
development as such.
3 
It is widely accepted that the effects of TRIPS on industry and technology will vary 
according to countries’ levels of economic development.
4 The need for, and benefits of, 
stronger intellectual property protection seems to rise with incomes and technological 
sophistication. If this were so, there would be a case for adjusting TRIPS requirements to the 
specific conditions of particular countries. To quote a recent publication by the World Bank,  
“Because the overwhelming majority of intellectual property … is created in the 
industrialized countries, TRIPS has decidedly shifted the global rules of the game in 
favour of those countries… Developing countries went along with the TRIPS 
agreement for a variety of reasons, ranging from the hope of additional access to 
agricultural and apparel markets in rich nations, to an expectation that stronger IPRs 
would encourage additional technology transfer and innovation. However, the 
promise of long-term benefits seems uncertain and costly to achieve in many nations, 
especially the poorest countries. In addition, the administrative costs and problems 
with higher prices for medicines and key technological inputs loom large in the minds 
of policy makers in developing countries. Many are pushing for significant revisions 
of the agreement.  
“There are reasons to believe that the enforcement of IPRs has a positive impact 
on growth prospects. On the domestic level, growth is spurred by higher rates of 
innovation – although this result tends to be fairly insignificant until countries move 
into the middle-income bracket. Nonetheless, across the range of income levels, IPRs 
are associated with greater trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, which in 
turn translate into faster rates of economic growth. The most appropriate level of IPRs 
enforcement therefore varies by income level.” (World Bank (2001), p. 129, emphasis 
added). 
The Bank concludes as follows: “the strength of intellectual property protection 
depends on economic and social circumstances, which in turn affect perceptions of the 
                                                 
2 Since the focus here is on technological considerations in the classification, the aspect of IPRs it refers most directly 
to is patents. Copyrights and trademarks raise different sets of issues, and the case for strengthening them across the board is 
probably clearer than for patents. While some technological issues can also arise for copyrights (say, in software), and a case 
can be made for lax IPRs to promote local learning and dissemination, this is not considered separately here.  
3 For such analysis, see references in Maskus (2000), Gould and Gruben (1996) and World Bank (2001).  
4 See, for instance, Braga et al. (1999) and Maskus (2000).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS85   Page 3 
   
appropriate trade-off between invention and dissemination… Countries with a high 
ratio of R&D in gross domestic product (GDP) or a high proportion of scientists and 
engineers in the labour force have markedly stronger patent rights than others… 
Interests in encouraging low-cost imitation dominate policy until countries move into 
a middle-income range with domestic innovative and absorptive capabilities… Least-
developed countries devote virtually no resources to innovation and have little 
intellectual property to protect… Thus the majority of economic interests prefer weak 
protection” (World Bank, 2001, p. 131-2).  
The Bank also notes that history does not provide a clear guide to the growth effects of 
IPRs: “at different times and in different regions of the world, countries have realised high 
rates of growth under varying degrees of IPR protection” (p. 135). Given the clear net short-
term costs for less industrialised countries from IPRs  – higher prices for technology and 
protected products – a valid economic case for them to accept TRIPS entails that they reap 
larger net long-term benefits (technology and FDI inflows and stimulus to local innovation). 
Moreover, the present value of these benefits – discounted at an appropriate interest rate – must 
more than offset the present value of these costs. Given the mechanics of compound interest, 
this requires that the benefits be very large and accrue in the medium term: any that accrue 
after, say, a decade would be practically worthless in terms of present value. 
If these conditions are not met, other arguments can still be made for TRIPS, but these 
have little to do with the economic benefits to poor countries of stronger intellectual property 
protection per se. As the World Bank notes, many developing countries agreed to TRIPS in 
order to gain concessions from rich ones in other spheres of economic activity (or greater aid). 
Whether they actually did so remains an open question, since no one has quantified the costs of 
TRIPS and gains in related concessions.  
These important issues remain largely unresolved.  This paper is not intended to 
investigate them, but simply notes (section 2) some of the main arguments. It then analyses 
data on technological and related activity in 87 economies (developed, transition and 
developing), grouping them according to the expected effects of stronger IPRs. These are all 
the countries with significant industrial sectors on which comparable data are available for 
1985-98.  
2. THE IMPACT OF STRONGER IPRS ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
In economic analysis, intellectual property rights  – a temporary monopoly on the use of 
knowledge  – are a ‘second best’ solution to a failure in markets for knowledge and 
information. The nature of this failure is well known. Optimal resource allocation requires that 
all goods be sold at marginal cost, which in the case of new knowledge is assumed to be 
practically zero: its sale does not diminish the stock to the holder and information is assumed 
to be transmitted practically without cost. Optimisation thus demands that new knowledge be 
made available at marginal cost or for free to all those who can use it. Moreover, it is assumed 
that others can, if not legally prevented, easily imitate new knowledge at little or no cost. Thus, 
under perfectly competitive conditions, there would be no incentive on the part of private 
agents to invest in the creation of new productive knowledge.  
Since the creation and diffusion of new knowledge are desirable for growth, it is necessary 
to trade off static optimisation in favour of dynamic considerations. The optimum solution 
would be for the governments of innovating countries to subsidise innovators until the costs of 
the subsidies equalled the benefits to society, and to then allow the dissemination of knowledge QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS85   Page 4 
   
at marginal cost (Maskus, 2000, p. 30). It would be very difficult in practice to calculate the 
optimal research subsidy, and a practical second-best solution is to grant a temporary 
monopoly that enables innovators to reap ‘rents’ (profits in excess of normal competitive 
profits). Analysts admit that this does not yield a perfect solution to the market failure 
involved, but it is a compromise that has worked well in the past in the industrial countries that 
are the source of the overwhelming bulk of innovation.  
In theory, society reaps four kinds of benefits from granting temporary monopoly rights to 
innovators. Each is subject to qualifications as far as developing countries are concerned, taken 
up later.  
￿  The  stimulation of private innovation, the primary economic benefit of IPRs. The 
importance of this benefit rises with the pace of technical change – as at present – and with 
the ‘imitability’ of new technology, particularly in such activities as software. It also grows 
with globalization, which leads innovators (in particular large transnational companies) to 
gear their R&D to world rather than national markets. However, where the country in 
question has little or no local innovative capabilities, the strengthening of IPRs does not, by 
definition, stimulate domestic innovation.
5 The extent to which it stimulates global R&D 
then depends on its share of the market for particular innovative activities and its ability to 
pay for expensive new products.
6 Where the economy undertakes technological activity of 
an absorptive and adaptive kind – the great bulk of informal and R&D effort in newly 
industrialising countries  – stronger IPRs may have no effect in stimulating it. On the 
contrary, to t he extent that such effort involves copying and reverse engineering 
innovations elsewhere, it can constrict a vital source of learning, capability building and 
competitiveness.  
￿  The use of the new knowledge in productive activity (without such use, of course, there can 
be no financial reward to innovators in terms of higher prices and profits), leading to higher 
incomes, employment, competitiveness and so on for the economy as a whole. If the 
knowledge is not exploited within the economy, and its products are provided at higher 
prices than in with weak IPRs, the gains are correspondingly less and the costs 
correspondingly higher. There may still be gains, if innovation per se is stimulated by the 
existence of that country’s market and the new products represent a real gain in consumer 
welfare. This gain has to be set against not just the higher prices induced by IPRs but also 
against reductions in local economic activity as a result of the monopoly and longer term 
growth potential (say, from the constriction of local technological development based on 
copying and reverse engineering). 
                                                 
5 Developing countries can undertake considerable technological activity to master, adapt and improve upon imported 
technologies. Indeed, as Lall (2001) notes, differences in such capability building are the main factor differentiating between 
success and failure in industrial development. However, this kind of technological activity does not lead to patentable 
innovation and so does not need strong IPRs; indeed, as noted later, lax IPRs may be beneficial because they permit a major 
form of learning: imitation and reverse engineering.   
6 Note that this is a purely economic argument based on the social gains from innovation. It does not take into account 
the (non-economic) argument that it is ‘fair’ or ‘just’ to reward innovators, and that all users of innovations should share 
equally in providing these rewards. On these grounds, those who avoid their share are ‘free riding’ and should be penalised. 
This kind of moral argument is often explicitly or implicitly used in the debate on IPRs. However, it can be argued just as 
plausibly that poor consumers of innovations  should pay less than rich ones on moral, distributional or humanitarian 
grounds.  The issue then becomes whether aid, redistribution or charity should be given in this form – of lax IPRs that allow 
for lower prices – than in the form of direct financial flows between governments. Again, a good case can be made for 
innovative products consumed by large sections of poor populations (medicines, for example) that the impact via product 
prices is far greater and more effective than via aid channelled through the government. See UNDP (2001) for a discussion 
of some of the issues concerning the pharmaceutical industry and human development.    QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS85   Page 5 
   
￿  The  dissemination  of new knowledge to other agents, with IPRs providing the legal 
instrument on which to base contractual agreements (e.g. for procurement, licensing or 
sales). Stricter IPRs may facilitate the transfer of technology across national borders as well 
as increase local diffusion by providing an enforceable legal framework. This is likely to be 
of special significance for technology-intensive products and activities, where innovators 
are averse to selling technology to countries with weak IPRs, where leakage is a real 
possibility. It is also significant for large innovators that seek to enter into technology 
alliances and contracts with each other: this is the main reason why firms in industries like 
electronics (where IPRs are not important to protect innovation) take out patents (Cantwell 
and Andersen, 1996). Note that the legal framework raises the cost of technology to the 
buyer – otherwise it would be redundant: the payoff for buyers lies in the higher quantity 
and quality of knowledge flows. The economic benefit in a developing country depends on 
the presence of local agents capable of purchasing, absorbing and deploying new 
technologies, particularly complex high technologies. If no such agents exist, strict IPRs 
offer no benefit for technology transfer. If they exist, the size of the benefits depends on 
two things: the extent to which strict IPRs raise the cost of buying technologies, and 
whether the alternatives of copying and reverse engineering would have been feasible, 
cheaper and more rewarding in building up local technological capabilities.   
￿  The stimulation of innovation by other enterprises based on information disclosed in the 
patent. This is a very important benefit of the IPR system, but clearly its value is primarily 
to economies where there is intense innovative activity by large numbers of competing 
enterprises. Innovation ‘around’ a particular patent is one of the most dynamic sources of 
technological progress. However, this is of little or no value to poor and unindustrialised 
countries that lack a local innovative base.  
These qualifications are, of course, acknowledged in the IPR literature. It is widely 
accepted that the importance of IPRs varies considerably by two variables:  
ç The technological nature of the activity  
ç The nature of the economy  
Technological nature of the activity: The role of patents in stimulating R&D varies by 
activity. In industries where it is relatively easy for a competent firm to copy new products – 
fine chemicals and pharmaceuticals are the best examples – patents are vital for sustaining the 
large and risky R&D expenditures needed for product innovation. However, in industries 
where copying is very difficult and expensive  (these industries account for the bulk of 
manufacturing in most countries), patents  per se are not important for appropriating the 
benefits from innovation. There is a high degree of ‘tacit’ knowledge (technology-specific 
skills, experience, learning, information and organisation needed to be competitive) in 
technological activities in these industries. The best examples are complex engineering, 
electronics and much of ‘heavy’ industry, but there are many others.  
The classic analysis of this is by Mansfield (1986), who found large industry-wise 
differences in the innovation-promoting role of patents in the US. His analysis was based on 
responses from corporate executives about the share of innovative activity that would be 
deterred by the absence of patent protection. The results were: 65% in pharmaceuticals, 30% in 
chemicals, 18% in petroleum, 15% in machinery, 12% in metal products, 8% in primary 
metals, 4% in electrical machinery, 1% in other machinery and nil in office equipment, motor 
vehicles, rubber, and textiles. While executive responses may not always accurately reflect QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS85   Page 6 
   
underlying economic forces, Mansfield’s survey is in line with the findings of other studies. In 
particular, the special role of patents in pharmaceutical innovation is universally accepted. It 
also reflects what is known about industrial differences in tacit knowledge (Cantwell, 1999). 
Thus, the need for IPRs to promote innovation (or technology transfer) cannot be identical 
across activities; correspondingly, the ideal IPR regime must depend on the structure of 
economic activities in each country. Countries with little productive investment in IPR-
sensitive activities need less strict regimes than do those  with such activities, at least as 
technological factors are concerned. Many developing countries have negligible industrial 
activities in the former category. In fact, to the extent that they have local pharmaceutical 
industries, they have much to gain by weak IPRs that allow them to build up domestic 
capabilities. It is only when they reach the stage of innovating that they need strong IPRs even 
in these activities.    
Nature of the economy: More relevant to the present discussion is that the significance of 
IPRs varies by the level of development. As the World Bank notes, the main beneficiaries of 
TRIPS are the advanced countries that produce innovations. There are few benefits in terms of 
stimulating local innovation in developing countries. On the contrary, while there certainly is 
technological activity in many such countries, it consists mainly of learning to use imported 
technologies efficiently rather than to innovate on the technological frontier. Weak IPRs can 
help local firms in early stages to build technological capabilities by permitting imitation and 
reverse engineering. This is certainly borne out by the experience of the East Asian ‘Tigers’ 
like Korea and Taiwan that developed strong indigenous firms in an array of sophisticated 
industries.  
The available historical and cross-section evidence supports the presumption that the need 
for IPRs varies with the level of development. Many rich countries used weak IPR protection 
in their early stages of industrialisation to develop local technological bases, increasing 
protection as they approached the leaders.
7 Econometric cross-section evidence suggests that 
there is an inverted-U shaped relationship between the strength of IPRs and income levels. The 
intensity of IPRs first falls with rising incomes, as countries move to slack IPRs to build local 
capabilities by copying, then rises as they engage in more innovative effort. The turning point 
is $7,750 per capita in 1985 prices (cited in Maskus, 2000, and World Bank, 2001), a fairly 
high level of income for the developing world. 
Theory also suggests that the benefits of IPRs rise with income and that at very low levels 
the costs of strengthening IPRs may well outweigh the gains. Maskus (2000) notes three 
potential costs.  
1.  Higher prices for imported products and new technologies under IPR protection.  
2.  Loss of economic activity, by the closure of imitative activities  
3.  The possible abuse of protection by patent holders, especially large foreign 
companies.  
Maskus goes on to argue, however, that these costs are more than offset by the longer-term 
benefits of IPRs, even in developing countries. These benefits are (with qualifications noted): 
                                                 
7 Chang (2001), Rasiah (2001).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS85   Page 7 
   
1. IPRs provide “an important  foundation for sophisticated business structures” and 
indicate that private property rights in general are well enforced. There may certainly exist an 
important  signalling function  of IPRs, particularly in countries that previously had policy 
regimes inimical to private investment and property rights. Note, however, that while strong 
IPRs may well be associated with sophisticated business structures, the causation is likely to 
run from the latter to the former. It is difficult to believe that strong IPRs actually cause the 
business systems to become more complex: many countries with sophisticated industrial and 
corporate structures have had lax IPRs. On the signalling function, more research is needed 
before it can be asserted with confidence that IPRs by themselves are important. It is possible 
that other signals are considered more important by investors or technology sellers, and that the 
overall environment for business matters more than IPRs. Casual empiricism suggests that lax 
IPRs have not deterred FDI in China or Brazil, or held back technology licensing in Korea and 
Taiwan, when these countries had weak protection.  
2. Other kinds of technological activity in developing countries (i.e. apart from innovation) 
also benefit from strong IPRs. This applies, however, more to copyright and trademark 
protection (where strong protection can encourage quality improvement) rather than to 
patenting. As far as patenting goes, it is mainly the advanced newly industrialising countries 
that will need TRIPS to boost local R&D. The least developed countries are unlikely to benefit 
in any technological sense. Those between the two, countries still building technological 
capabilities by imitating and reverse engineering, may lose. Remember that the rationale of 
TRIPS is letting innovators (overwhelmingly in developed countries) charge higher prices for 
their protected (physical and intellectual) products. If TRIPS is at all effective, it must lead to 
more costly and restricted technology for local firms in poor countries.  
3. Economies without advanced technological capabilities may, by strengthening IPRs, 
stimulate global innovation by adding to effective demand for new products. This argument 
would apply to activities in which poor countries constituted a significant share of innovators’ 
markets. However, in most activities in which patents matter for innovation, as in 
pharmaceuticals, the specific products needed by poor countries constitute a tiny fraction of 
global demand. So far, leading innovators have undertaken very little R&D of specific interest 
to poor countries – this is simply not profitable enough (UNDP, 2001, World Bank, 2001). 
There is therefore little reason to believe that global R&D would rise with stronger IPRs in 
these countries or that it would address their specific needs. The argument that strong IPRs in 
developing countries would promote global R&D has another fallacy.  Small, poor countries 
are not only likely to remain irrelevant to innovation after TRIPS, they may suffer reduced 
industrial activity if industry leaders use IPRs to close local facilities and import the product 
from other production sites.
8 This is actually happening in a number of developing countries, 
but its full incidence needs further investigation.  
4. Strong IPRs will stimulate greater technology transfer over the longer-term to 
developing countries. This may apply to all its main forms: capital goods, FDI and licensing. 
The main evidence on this comes from some cross-country econometric tests (cited by Maskus, 
2000) that suggest a positive correlation between the strength of IPRs and capital goods 
imports, inward FDI and licensing payments. These studies, however, are subject to caveats, 
and other studies have more ambiguous implications (World Bank, 2001). The correlation 
between IPRs and capital goods imports, for instance, may be due to unobserved variables that 
                                                 
8 The main recourse countries have is compulsory licensing, but the use of this instrument is constrained in many poor 
countries by other factors like economic pressures brought by the home countries of innovators.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS85   Page 8 
   
tend to rise with IPRs.  For instance, higher levels of income, stronger technological 
capabilities, greater ability to pay, and so on, may be the cause of greater equipment purchases 
rather than stronger IPRs per se. This is not to deny that the sale of some high-tech equipment 
may be affected by weak IPR regimes. Even where this is true, it is likely to be significant only 
for economies with advanced industrial capabilities rather than to typical developing countries. 
For the latter, if TRIPS raises the price of equipment (which is the purpose of the exercise), 
there is a net loss to productive capacity. In any case, anecdotal evidence does not suggest 
weak IPRs in countries like Korea and Taiwan prevented them from buying advanced capital 
goods in their most intense periods of industrialisation.  
As far as FDI goes, most studies suggest that IPRs come fairly low on the list of factors 
affecting TNC location decisions.
9 However, the general tightening of IPRs in recent years 
may itself have raised their signalling value to investors: countries with stronger property 
rights protection may, as a result, be regarded as more favourably inclined to private business. 
The extent to which this is so needs more empirical investigation. Even if this were found to be 
true, it would suggest failures in information markets affecting FDI location rather than the 
value to TNCs of intellectual property protection as such.  Because of such unobserved 
variables, the cross-country econometric evidence on the positive and significant impact of IPR 
strength on FDI inflows is again of rather dubious value. What is more plausible is, as case 
study evidence suggests, that the deterrent effect of weak IPRs is fairly industry specific. As 
Mansfield (1994) notes in his survey of US TNCs, investment is likely to be sensitive to IPRs 
mainly in industries like pharmaceuticals. Other FDI – constituting the bulk of investment of 
interest to developing countries – is not likely to be affected by IPRs. In fact, the largest 
recipients of inward FDI in the developing world in the past two decades or so, led by China, 
have not been models of strong intellectual property protection. TNCs have had many other 
advantages that have served to effectively protect their proprietary intellectual assets. 
Even in IPR-sensitive industries like pharmaceuticals, the evidence does not establish that 
TNCs have stayed away from developing countries with weak IPRs. TNCs have invested large 
sums in this industry in countries like Brazil or India, which have built up among the most 
advanced pharmaceutical industries in the developing world, in both local enterprises and TNC 
affiliates. Several pharmaceutical TNCs have been contracting R&D to national laboratories in 
India for the past 10-15 years. At the same time, weak IPRs have facilitated a massive growth 
of pharmaceutical exports by India, with l ocal firms building capabilities in making generic 
products. It is difficult, therefore, to make a case that TRIPS would, by itself, lead to a 
significant surge in FDI to developing countries. It is possible to argue, however, that India has 
now reached a stage in pharmaceutical production where stronger IPRs would induce greater 
innovation by local firms (the benefits of which would have to be set off against the closure of 
other firms). This clearly does not provide a case for similar IPRs in countries in earlier stages 
of industrial development – if anything, it is an argument for lax IPRs to encourage the growth 
of local firms until they reach the stage of Indian firms today.  
Note also that the TNC response to IPRs is likely to be function specific. Survey evidence 
suggests that high-level R&D is more likely to be affected by the IPR regime than basic 
production or marketing (Mansfield, 1994). The relocation of R&D is not of great practical 
significance to most developing countries, since very few can hope to receive such functions; it 
is only the more advanced NIEs that may suffer from lax IPRs.  
                                                 
9 See Braga et al. (1999), Luthria (1999), Chang (2001) and Rasiah (2001).   QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS85   Page 9 
   
Similar arguments apply to licensing. Lax IPRs are likely to deter licensing mainly in the 
advanced activities of interest to the leading NIEs. They are unlikely to affect technology 
transfer to other developing countries, which generally purchase more mature technologies. At 
the same time, the higher costs of technology transfer inherent in TRIPS are likely to impose 
an immediate penalty on them. It is suggested, however, that local diffusion of technology will 
benefit from stronger IPRs because of the clearer legal framework it provides. This is certainly 
possible, but the evidence on this needs to be more closely investigated. Anecdotal evidence 
does not however suggest that lax IPRs held back licensing of local firms in such economies as 
Korea and Taiwan.  
All the arguments suggest, therefore, that it is vital to distinguish between levels of 
development in assessing the impact of TRIPS in the developing world. As Maskus rightly 
suggests, the relationships between IPRs and growth remain ‘complex’ and ‘dependent on 
circumstances’ (Maskus, 2000, p. 169). On the whole, there is no clear case that most 
developing countries below the NIE stage will gain in net terms  from TRIPS; the least 
developed ones are most likely to lose. The gains that might accrue through increased 
technological inflows are likely to be realised over the long term, while the costs will accrue 
immediately. In present value terms, therefore, there is likely to be a significant net loss. What 
is indisputable is that a differentiated approach to TRIPS is called for.   
To conclude, the jury is still out on the benefits of TRIPS for developing countries as a 
whole. We can agree that stronger IPRs are probably beneficial for countries launching into 
serious R&D activity in terms of promoting local innovation and attracting certain kinds of 
FDI and other technology inflows. There does not, however, seem to be a case for applying 
stronger IPRs uniformly across the developing world. As the outcome is likely to be context 
specific, economic considerations call for a differentiated approach to TRIPS according to 
levels of industrial and technological capabilities. Some differentiation exists already, as the 
World Bank (2001) notes. Whether or not this is sufficient to take due account of the 
development needs of many countries is not clear. Without more detailed investigation, it may 
be premature to draw any general conclusions about the net benefits for TRIPS.  
3. CLASSIFICATION OF COUNTRIES BY IPR RELEVANCE 
We now categorise countries (including mature industrial countries and some transition 
economies on which data are available) according to different schema, based on technological 
activity, industrial performance and technology imports. The classifications naturally have a 
great deal of similarity, but also some interesting differences. It is useful to consider each to see 
how the implications may differ with respect to IPRs. As noted, the focus here is on 
technological factors and the data used relate mainly to these elements of TRIPS (i.e. patents). 
There are, of course, many other important elements in TRIPS: copyrights, trademarks, 
geographical indications, industrial designs and so on. Some of these may be subject to similar 
technological considerations as patents (e.g. industrial designs, layout designs for integrated 
circuits). However, others, particularly copyrights and trademarks, may raise different issues 
with respect to costs and benefits for countries at low levels of development. This paper does 
not explore these aspects.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS85   Page 10 
   
3.1 TECHNOLOGICAL ACTIVITY 
The classification based on national technological activity is derived from two variables: R&D 
financed by productive enterprises
10 and the number of patents taken out internationally (in the 
US)
11, both deflated by population to adjust for economic size. Most researchers on 
international technological activity use US patent data, for two reasons. First, practically all 
innovators who seek to exploit their technology internationally take out patents in the USA, 
given its market size and technological strength. The pattern of patenting in the USA is in fact 
a good indicator of technological activity and R&D spending in all industrialised (and newly 
industrialising) countries (Cantwell and Andersen, 1996). Second, the data are readily available 
and can be taken to an extremely detailed level. We follow this convention, using US patents as 
an indicator of commercially valuable innovation.  
The two variables are standardised
12 and averaged to yield an index of ‘technological 
intensity’. We can derive four groups from the index values.  
1.  The world  technological leaders,  with intense technological activity and considerable 
innovative capabilities as shown by international patenting. They are likely to benefit from 
(and most already have) strong IPRs.  
2.  Countries with moderate technological activity. These countries conduct some R&D, have 
medium levels of industrial development and are likely on balance to benefit from stronger 
IPRs. However, some countries in this group may bear significant adjustment costs in 
changing IPR regimes. 
3.  Countries with  low technological activity. These countries are likely to have both 
significant costs and potential long-term benefits from stricter IPRs, depending on the level 
of domestic technological capabilities and their reliance on formal technology inflows. 
Those that are building their innovation systems on the basis of local firms copying foreign 
technology and importing technologies at arm’s length would gain less than those with a 
strong TNC presence.  
4.  The fourth level comprises countries with no significant technological activity. These are 
the least industrialised countries with the simplest technological structures that are likely to 
gain least, and lose most, from strict IPR rules. They will tend to pay the costs (higher 
prices for protected products and technologies) but gain little by way of technology 
development or transfer.  
Table 1 shows the average technology performance data for each group of countries, and 
illustrates the striking differences between them. The value of R&D per capita in the high 
                                                 
10 The R&D data are in current US dollars. We prefer R&D financed by productive enterprises to total R&D because 
the latter includes expenditures on defence, agriculture and so on that are not directly relevant to innovation by private 
agents. However, both measures (in dollar terms) yield very similar national rankings, and the results would not change 
significantly if we used total R&D figures.  
11 Patents taken out internationally include those filed by affiliates of TNCs operating in the country. This does not 
matter for present purposes since local R&D by TNCs reflects the innovative capacity of the host country. 
12 The values for each variable are standardised according to the following formula.  
value X value X










= , where the highest country in the rank scores 1 and the lowest 
scores 0.  
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technology effort group is 21 times higher than in the moderate group, which in turn is 58 
times higher than in the low effort group. The fourth group, as its name indicates, has 
negligible activity by all measures. Differences by international patenting are even greater,
13 
suggesting that the innovativeness of R&D rises with its intensity and that different countries 
may have different propensities to take out patents internationally. 
Table 1: Average technology effort (per country) by technology groups, 1997-98 
Technology 
groups 
R&D per capita 
(US$) 






High   293.25  14.93  0.99  6,803 
Moderate   14.01  0.41  0.02  50 
Low   0.24  0.08  0.00  11 
Negligible   0.00  0.00  0.00  0 
Source: Calculated from UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook; OECD, Science, Technology and 
Industry Scoreboard 1999; Iberoamerican Network of Science and Technology Indicators; 
various national statistical sources. 
Note: R&D is only that financed by productive enterprises. Patents are those taken out in the 
US. Total R&D and patents are average for each country. 
Let us now consider technological effort at the national level. Table 2 gives the data for 
productive enterprise R&D and international patents for 87 countries (those with significant 
industrial activity on which the necessary data are available). They come from the following 
groups: 
￿  Industrialised (22): Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States,  
￿  Transition (7): Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Russian Federation, Romania, Albania 
and Slovenia.  
￿  Developing (58), consisting of the following sub-groups:  
à East Asia (9): China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand.  
à South Asia (5): India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. 
à Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) (18): Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
à Sub-Saharan Africa  (SSA) (16): Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, 
Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.  
                                                 
13 However, the ranks according to R&D and international patenting are very similar overall, with a the correlation 
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à Middle East and North Africa (MENA)(10): Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt,  Jordan, 
Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey and Yemen.  
Table 2: Technology Effort Index (1997-98) 
  Productive enterprise 
R&D 
per capita (US$) 
Patents per 1,000 
people 
Technology Effort Index  Technolo
gy Group 
1  Switzerland  859.9  USA  3.297  1  Japan  0.8649 
2  Japan  858.4  Japan  2.412  2  Switzerland  0.7858 
3  Sweden  653.9  Switzerland  1.884  3  USA  0.7709 
4  USA   465.9  Taiwan  1.622  4  Sweden  0.5957 
5  Germany  418.1  Sweden  1.421  5  Germany  0.4151 
6  Finland  413.4  Israel  1.275  6  Finland  0.4099 
7  Denmark  328.4  Germany  1.134  7  Denmark  0.3434 
8  France  297.6  Finland  1.118  8  Taiwan  0.3173 
9  Norway  275.5  Canada  1.090  9  Netherlands  0.2743 
10  Belgium  272.7  Denmark  1.005  10  France  0.2716 
11  Netherlands  258.8  Netherlands  0.817  11  Israel  0.2712 
12  Austria  214.4  Belgium  0.699  12  Belgium  0.2645 
13  S Korea  211.2  S Korea  0.657  13  Canada  0.2488 
14  Singapore  198.4  France  0.650  14  Norway  0.2344 
15  UK  174.5  UK  0.601  15  S Korea  0.2225 
16  Ireland  152.8  H Kong  0.540  16  Austria  0.2022 
17  Australia  148.0  Austria  0.511  17  UK  0.1926 
18  Canada  143.7  Norway  0.490  18  Singapore  0.1738 
19  Israel  134.0  Australia  0.402  19  Australia  0.1470 
20  Taiwan  122.5  Singapore  0.386  20  Ireland  0.1191 
21  Italy  90.1  N Zealand  0.356  21  Italy  0.0986 
22  Slovenia  73.3  Italy  0.305  22  N Zealand  0.0835 
23  Spain  55.2  Ireland  0.200  23  H Kong  0.0829 
HIGH 
24  N Zealand  50.7  Slovenia  0.076  24  Slovenia  0.0541 
25  Czech Rep  32.3  Spain  0.072  25  Spain  0.0431 
26  Portugal  14.1  Hungary  0.045  26  Czech 
Republic 
0.0200 
27  Brazil  13.7  S Africa  0.030  27  Hungary  0.0135 
28  Greece  13.5  Malaysia  0.017  28  S Africa  0.0121 
29  S Africa  12.8  Greece  0.016  29  Greece  0.0103 
30  Hungary  11.3  Bahrain  0.016  30  Portugal  0.0096 
31  Argentina  8.5  Venezuela  0.013  31  Brazil  0.0087 
32  Poland  8.3  Russian Fed  0.012  32  Argentina  0.0067 
33  Russian Fed  7.5  Argentina  0.011  33  Malaysia  0.0065 
34  Malaysia  6.7  Chile  0.011  34  Russian Fed  0.0062 
35  C Rica  5.5  Uruguay  0.009  35  Poland  0.0055 
36  Chile  5.3  Portugal  0.009  36  Chile  0.0047 
37  Turkey  4.8  Mexico  0.009  37  C Rica  0.0041 
38  Romania  2.5  Czech Rep  0.008  38  Venezuela  0.0033 
39  Venezuela  2.3  Saudi 
Arabia 
0.006  39  Turkey  0.0029 
40  H Kong  1.8  Ecuador  0.006  40  Bahrain  0.0024 
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42  Panama  1.4  Brazil  0.005  42  Uruguay  0.0020 
43  Uruguay  1.1  Jordan  0.004  43  Romania  0.0015 
 
44  China  0.9  Poland  0.004  44  Saudi 
Arabia 
0.0009 
45  Indonesia  0.8  Jamaica  0.004  45  Ecuador  0.0009 
46  India  0.4  Philippines  0.003  46  Panama  0.0008 
47  Mauritius  0.3  Thailand  0.002  47  Jordan  0.0008 
48  Thailand  0.3  Guatemala  0.002  48  China  0.0006 
49  Egypt  0.2  Colombia  0.002  49  Jamaica  0.0006 
50  Colombia  0.2  Honduras  0.002  50  Philippines  0.0006 
51  Jordan  0.2  Bolivia  0.001  51  Indonesia  0.0005 
52  Guatemala  0.1  Tunisia  0.001  52  Thailand  0.0005 
53  Algeria  0.1  Sri Lanka  0.001  53  Colombia  0.0004 
54  Saudi 
Arabia 
0.1  India  0.001  54  India  0.0004 
55  Peru  0.1  Morocco  0.001  55  Guatemala  0.0003 
56  Morocco  0.1  China  0.001  56  Honduras  0.0003 
57  Philippines  0.1  Turkey  0.000  57  Sri Lanka  0.0002 
58  Honduras  0.1  Indonesia  0.000  58  Bolivia  0.0002 
59  Nicaragua  0.1  Peru  0.000  59  Mauritius  0.0002 
60  Sri Lanka  0.1  Kenya  0.000  60  Morocco  0.0002 
-  Yemen  0  Egypt  0.000  61  Tunisia  0.0002 
-  Tunisia  0  Nigeria  0.000  62  Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
0.0001 
-  Malawi  0  Pakistan  0.000  63  Peru  0.0001 
-  Madagascar  0  Albania  0.000  64  Algeria  0.0001 
-  Kenya  0  Algeria  0.000  65  Nicaragua  0.0001 
-  Jamaica  0  Bangladesh  0.000  66  Kenya  0.0001 
LOW 
-  Ecuador  0  Cameroon  0.000  -  Nigeria  0.0000 
-  Albania  0  CAR  0.000  -  Pakistan  0.0000 
-  Bahrain  0  El Salvador  0.000  -  Albania  0.0000 
-  Bangladesh  0  Ethiopia  0.000  -  Bangladesh  0.0000 
-  Bolivia  0  Ghana  0.000  -  Cameroon  0.0000 
-  Cameroon  0  Madagascar  0.000  -  CAR  0.0000 
-  CAR  0  Malawi  0.000  -  El Salvador  0.0000 
-  El Salvador  0  Mauritius  0.000  -  Ethiopia  0.0000 
-  Ethiopia  0  Mozambiqu
e 
0.000  -  Ghana  0.0000 
-  Ghana  0  Nepal  0.000  -  Madagascar  0.0000 
-  Mozambiqu
e 
0  Nicaragua  0.000  -  Malawi  0.0000 
-  Nepal  0  Oman  0.000  -  Mozambiqu
e 
0.0000 
-  Nigeria  0  Panama  0.000  -  Nepal  0.0000 
-  Oman  0  Paraguay  0.000  -  Oman  0.0000 
-  Pakistan  0  Romania  0.000  -  Paraguay  0.0000 
-  Paraguay  0  Senegal  0.000  -  Senegal  0.0000 
-  Senegal  0  Tanzania  0.000  -  Tanzania  0.0000 
-  Tanzania  0  Uganda  0.000  -  Uganda  0.0000 
-  Uganda  0  Yemen  0.000  -  Yemen  0.0000 
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-  Zambia  0  Zambia  0.000  -  Zambia  0.0000 
-  Zimbabwe  0  Zimbabwe  0.000  -  Zimbabwe  0.0000 
 
Note: - stands for country not ranked 
 
The choice of groups was based on getting a spread of more or less equal numbers in each, 
but there are clear ‘breaks’ in the technology index where the lines are drawn. The main 
features of the groups are as follows: 
Group 1: This group has most industrialised countries, but there are interesting inclusions 
and exclusions. Perhaps the most important for the present discussion is the presence of the 
four mature Asian Tigers, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong (in order of ranking). 
These are technological newcomers, and have followed different strategies to build up their 
capabilities (Lall, 1996). Korea and Taiwan used considerable industrial policy: import 
protection, export subsidies, credit targeting, FDI restrictions and slack IPR rules. Singapore 
combined widespread government interventions with a free trade regime and heavy reliance on 
(targeted) FDI to build a very high-tech industrial sector. Hong Kong was the least 
interventionist, confining government policy to infrastructure, subsidised land and housing and 
support for export activity and SMEs.  
Taiwan appears in the technology index at an unexpectedly high position (8), largely 
because of its high rank in international patenting. Korea is in 15
th place, with greater R&D 
than Taiwan but less US patenting; even so, it comes ahead of mature OECD countries like 
Austria, UK or Italy. Singapore comes 18
th, which may be unexpected in view of its heavy 
TNC dependence. While it is generally the case that TNCs are slow to transfer R&D to 
developing host countries, Singapore has managed, by dint of targeted policies and a strong 
skill base, to induce foreign affiliates to set up significant R&D facilities there. At number 23, 
Hong Kong brings up the rear among the Tigers and in the group as a whole. Its R&D rank is 
very low (40) but its index position is pulled up by its patent rank (16); it is not clear what 
accounts for this discrepancy between R&D and patenting.  
Note again that weak IPRs played a vital role in the technological development of Korea 
and Taiwan, the two leading Tigers. They are the best recent examples of the use of copying 
and reverse engineering to build competitive, technology-intensive industrial sectors with 
considerable innovative ‘muscle’. However, unlike many other developing countries that had 
weak IPRs, they were able to use the opportunities offered effectively because of investments 
in skill development, strong export orientation, ample inflows of foreign capital goods and 
strong government incentives for R&D (Lall, 1996). It may also be the case that the political 
economy that allowed such strong industrial policy to work was difficult to replicate in other 
countries. Singapore, by contrast, had strong IPR protection. It is unlikely that it would have 
been able to build up TNC-based R&D without this. Note also that in recent years Korea and 
Taiwan have also moved to strong IPR regimes, partly under pressure from trading partners but 
also because their enterprise have now reached the technological stage where they need greater 
protection.  
Among the interesting exclusions from Group 1 are South European countries like Spain, 
Greece and Portugal: the technological laggards of West Europe. The Russian Federation is 
also excluded. Not only has its R&D declined recently, it ranks low in terms both of enterprise 
funded R&D and of patents taken out in the US. Ireland is at the low end of the group, but its 
presence is creditable given its historic industrial backwardness. Its relatively recent entry into 
technology-intensive industrial activity has, like Singapore, been driven by electronics TNC QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS85   Page 15 
   
(together with a substantial pharmaceutical presence), and its technological effort is also 
dominated by foreign affiliates.  
In this context, it is interesting to look at the (patchy) data on the role of TNCs in host 
country R&D (Figure 1).
14 As expected, the technological leaders in the OECD, like Germany 
and USA, despite open FDI regimes, have a relatively low share of affiliate R&D. Japan has 
been traditionally hostile to FDI, so the share is particularly low (the same is probably true of 
Korea, but data are not available). At the other extreme, Ireland in the developed, and 
Singapore and Malaysia in the developing, world depend highly of affiliate R&D. We return to 
the role of FDI as such below. 










































































































































 Italy is known to be a relatively weak R&D performer (this also shows up in rank in 
international patenting) despite its advanced industrial sector. This is, however, in line with its 
specialisation in (skill intensive) fashion products and heavy industries (automobiles and 
machinery) of moderate R&D  intensity. Australia and New Zealand also lag in the high 
technology group.  
Group 2: This group of moderate technology performers includes, as noted, the South 
European countries and Russia. It also contains other CEE countries like Slovenia, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania. From the developing world it has the main Latin 
American economies: Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Mexico, along with Costa Rica, Venezuela 
and Uruguay. Only Malaysia appears here from Asia, South Africa from SSA, and Turkey and 
Bahrain from MENA. Most of these countries have fairly large industrial sectors, and some 
have a significant TNC presence.  
Group 3: The group of low technology performers is very diverse. On the one hand it has 
large countries with heavy industrial sectors like China, India and Egypt, along with dynamic 
export oriented economies (with a high reliance on TNCs) like Thailand and Indonesia. On the 
other it has countries with small industrial sectors and weak industrial exports like Panama, 
Jamaica, Sri Lanka, Bolivia or Kenya. Some countries have fairly large and impressive 
technological activity in absolute terms – India and China stand out – but are lumped with 
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economies that have very little (financed by the productive sector). The use of population to 
deflate the variables may distort the picture somewhat for such large countries, though it may 
be argued that technological effort in China and India is quite low relative to their economic 
size. These problems are inevitable in any such classification exercise, particularly as one 
approaches the lower limits.  
In this group, therefore, the implications of stronger IPRs are likely to be fairly varied. 
Economies with significant technological effort and/or strong local enterprises (e.g. India, 
China or Thailand) are likely to benefit from slack IPRs in some aspects and gain from them in 
others. Those with little ‘real’ innovative capabilities or competitive enterprises may not be 
able to utilise slack IPRs to build up local technology, and may gain from FDI inflows by 
strengthening IPRs. At the same time, TRIPS may lead to net costs for some countries with no 
corresponding benefits. At this stage it is difficult to discern the net outcome. 
Group 4: This group has no meaningful technological activity by either measure (and the 
countries are not ranked individually). It contains all the least developed countries (by the UN 
definition) in the sample, as well as South Asian countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh and 
Nepal, several countries in SSA, one East European economy (Albania) and El Salvador from 
LAC. The distinction between these countries and those at the bottom of Group 3 should not, 
for obvious reasons, be pushed too far. In essence, they can be considered together as the set of 
economies for whom IPRs are irrelevant for technology development and transfer and where 
the costs are likely to outweigh the benefits.  
3.2 COMPETITIVE INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE  
We now use ‘competitive industrial performance’ to rank countries and then combine the 
technology index with the performance index. The performance measures used here are MVA 
per capita, manufactured exports per capital, the share of medium and high technology (MHT) 
products in MVA and the share of MHT in manufactured exports. All the data are for 1998 (for 
further analysis and explanation see UNIDO, 2002). For a classification of traded products by 
technology levels see Annex Table 1.  
In general, there is a strong relationship between the technology and industrial 
performance indices (correlation coefficient of 0.80). This is to be expected, since 
technological effort is intimately related to levels of industrialisation, success in export activity 
and the sophistication of the production and export structures. The causation runs both ways, of 
course, but most analysts would agree that strong technological capabilities contribute to all 
these aspects of performance. The elements of the industrial performance index are also 
strongly correlated with each other, with coefficients ranging between 0.57 and 0.81.  
Table 3 shows the industrial performance index with all its components. There are five 
groups here, according to ‘natural’ breaks in the final performance index. There is little need to 
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Table 3: Industrial Performance Index  



















6,178  32,713  80.00%  74.30%  0.883 
2  Switzerla
nd 
8,315  10,512  63.00%  62.90%  0.751 
3  Ireland  7,043  15,659  65.00%  51.20%  0.739 
4  Japan  7,084  2,929  66.00%  81.10%  0.696 
5  Germany  5,866  5,939  64.00%  64.80%  0.632 
6  USA  5,301  2,035  63.00%  65.40%  0.564 
7  Sweden  5,295  8,396  61.00%  58.20%  0.562 
8  Finland  5,557  7,918  53.00%  49.80%  0.538 
9  Belgium  4,446  15,050  51.00%  46.90%  0.495 
10  UK  4,179  4,100  62.00%  62.90%  0.473 
11  France  4,762  4,486  53.00%  58.40%  0.465 
12  Austria  5,191  6,615  50.00%  49.10%  0.453 
13  Denmark  4,776  6,850  51.00%  39.50%  0.443 
14  Netherlan
ds 
3,953  8,894  60.00%  50.00%  0.429 
15  Taiwan  3,351  4,834  57.00%  61.30%  0.412 
16  Canada  3,489  5,383  51.00%  47.10%  0.407 
17  Italy  4,082  3,958  52.00%  50.90%  0.384 
18  S Korea  2,108  2,560  60.00%  62.30%  0.370 
19  Spain  2,365  4,275  49.00%  52.50%  0.319 
20  Israel  2,599  3,702  54.00%  46.10%  0.301 














22  Malaysia  937  2,973  60.00%  65.10%  0.278 
23  Mexico  855  1,082  36.00%  65.50%  0.246 
24  Czech 
Republic 
1,612  2,567  48.00%  51.90%  0.243 
25  Philippin
es 
190  374  36.00%  74.70%  0.241 
26  Portugal  2,631.20  2,336  31.00%  39.70%  0.240 
27  Hungary  947  2,017  46.00%  58.80%  0.239 
28  Slovenia  2,365  4,275  50.00%  27.80%  0.221 
29  Australia  2,488  1,151  51.00%  14.60%  0.211 
30  H Kong  1,411  3,460  52.00%  36.80%  0.204 
31  N 
Zealand 
2,611  1,626  40.00%  14.50%  0.186 
32  Thailand  585  731  39.00%  44.90%  0.172 
33  Brazil  912  234  58.00%  34.30%  0.149 
34  Poland  779  629  45.00%  35.70%  0.143 
35  Argentina  1,475  391  37.00%  23.30%  0.140 
36  C Rica  557  971  30.00%  32.60%  0.129 
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38  S Africa  557  322  44.00%  25.90%  0.108 
39  Turkey  695  361  38.00%  23.50%  0.108 
40  Greece  928  758  31.00%  17.90%  0.102 
 
41  Romania  466  339  34.00%  23.60%  0.095 
42  Bahrain  1,577  688  22.00%  5.70%  0.089 
43  Uruguay  1,125  472  21.00%  14.60%  0.087 
44  Russian 
Fed 
663  202  41.00%  16.30%  0.077 
45  Tunisia  390  554  19.00%  15.50%  0.068 
46  Venezuel
a 
607  337  32.00%  10.30%  0.060 
47  Chile  749  443  26.00%  6.30%  0.056 
48  Guatemal
a 
237  129  35.00%  15.00%  0.056 
49  India  65  26  59.00%  16.60%  0.054 
50  Indonesia  115  132  40.00%  15.50%  0.054 
51  Zimbabw
e 
77  75  27.00%  15.30%  0.052 
52  El 
Salvador 
426  134  28.00%  11.50%  0.051 
53  Morocco  219  112  25.00%  12.40%  0.048 
54  Saudi 
Arabia 
605  702  54.00%  5.20%  0.047 
55  Colombia  322  104  35.00%  8.90%  0.041 
56  Mauritius  739  1,434  12.00%  1.40%  0.041 
57  Egypt  326  37  39.00%  8.80%  0.038 
58  Peru  585  91  25.00%  4.60%  0.035 
59  Oman  293  406  20.00%  5.80%  0.032 
60  Pakistan  73  56  34.00%  9.20%  0.031 
Medium-Low 
61  Ecuador  354  78  11.00%  4.20%  0.025 
62  Kenya  37  28  24.00%  7.60%  0.025 
63  Jordan  189  103  31.00%  5.00%  0.024 
64  Honduras  138  48  12.00%  6.00%  0.023 
65  Jamaica  372  446  25.00%  1.50%  0.022 
66  Panama  271  80  16.00%  4.00%  0.022 
67  Albania  184  53  19.00%  4.20%  0.021 
68  Bolivia  178  81  11.00%  5.00%  0.021 
69  Nicaragu
a 
67  30  15.00%  3.90%  0.017 
70  Sri Lanka  125  162  16.00%  4.00%  0.017 
71  Paraguay  247  66  11.00%  2.20%  0.015 
72  Mozambi
que 
22  4  12.00%  3.40%  0.013 
73  Banglade
sh 
60  37  28.00%  2.90%  0.011 
Low 
74  Algeria  154  95  29.00%  0.80%  0.009 
75  Cameroo
n 
65  34  11.00%  1.80%  0.008 
76  Senegal  82  35  16.00%  1.40%  0.008 
77  Zambia  40  11  24.00%  1.80%  0.007 
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78  Nepal  18  16  15.00%  1.90%  0.006 
79  Nigeria  62  2  38.00%  1.50%  0.006 
80  Tanzania  16  3  25.00%  1.50%  0.005 
81  CAR  26  15  20.00%  0.80%  0.003 
82  Madagas
car 
27  9  10.00%  0.90%  0.003 
83  Malawi  21  6  29.00%  1.00%  0.003 
84  Uganda  24  1  15.00%  0.80%  0.003 
85  Ghana  9  22  17.00%  0.10%  0.001 
86  Yemen  34  2  20.00%  0.10%  0.001 
 
87  Ethiopia  8  1  9.00%  0.10%  0.000  
Source: Calculated from UNIDO database and UN Comtrade. 
Note: ‘MHT’ stands for medium and high technology products. Classification 
taken from Lall (2001), Chapter 4.  
 
What is the implication of industrial performance for IPRs? There is clearly a positive 
correlation between IPRs, industrial performance and technological effort. This does not mean, 
however, that IPRs are  causally related to growth and development: each rises with 
development levels. As noted, the causation can run both ways. Moreover, there is probably a 
strong non-linearity involved. Strong IPRs are probably beneficial beyond a certain level of 
industrial sophistication, while below this level their benefits for development are unclear. 
Moreover, the further down one goes in the scale the less evident the benefits become. In terms 
of the performance index, the ‘very low’ and ‘low’ performance groups are, on average, 
unlikely to benefit from TRIPS. In both ‘medium’ groups there is probably a mixture of 
beneficial and non-beneficial effects depending on the country, with a case for strengthening 
IPRs in the medium term. In the ‘high’ performance group the benefits are more unambiguous.   
There is one important factor here that may have a bearing on IPRs: the growth of 
‘international production systems’  under the aegis transnational companies  (UNCTAD, 
various). While TNCs have had export platforms in developing countries making complete 
products for some time, the emerging trend has been for them to locate (tightly linked) 
processes in different countries to serve global or regional markets. This trend is particularly 
marked in high-tech activities, led by electronics, where the high value-to-weight ratio of the 
products makes relocations of large numbers of processes economical. For instance, a 
semiconductor may be designed in one set of facilities (say, in the USA and Europe), the wafer 
fabricated elsewhere, and the assembly and testing done in others. Such shipping of 
intermediate electronics products across countries has made them the fastest growing segment 
of world trade, in conjunction with rapidly rising demand (Lall, 2001, chapter 4).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS85   Page 20 
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Table 4 shows the per capita value of total high technology exports and of total electronics 
exports by each country in 1998. There is the usual dispersion of national performance, and the 
group averages are distorted by the performance of a few countries. Take for example the 
average for Group 3, where China, Philippines and Thailand are completely out of line with the 
rest.   
The emergence of international production systems has made it possible for countries to 
move up the production, export and technological complexity ladder rapidly without first 
building a domestic technology base. Again, the East Asian economies bear this out. With the 
exception of Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, none has a strong domestic technology base in 
electronics. The electronics production system, however, only encompasses a small number of 
developing countries: Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines and China in East Asia, and 
Mexico in Latin America. The implications of this for industrial and technological 
development are analysed at greater length in UNIDO (2002).   
Does the promise of integrated systems mean that developing countries should adopt 
stronger IPRs in the hope of attracting export-oriented TNCs? In the short term the answer is 
probably ‘no’. Most TNC assembly activity has been attracted to developing countries without 
changing the national IPR regime by isolating export-processing zones from the rest of the 
economy. China is a good example. In the longer term, however, the answer is likely to be 
‘yes’ – at least for the countries that seek to attract high-tech production systems. Inducing 
TNCs to invest in such activities when competitors are offering stronger IPRs would force all 
aspirants to also have equally strong protection. Moreover, countries that are already have 
high-tech assembly operations would need to strengthen IPRs to induce TNCs to deepen their 
operations into more advanced technologies and functions like R&D and design. At the highest 
end of TNC activity, where developing countries compete directly with advanced industrial 
countries, the IPR regime would have to match the strongest one in the developed world. 
 However, as integrated systems are highly concentrated geographically, these 
considerations may not apply to many developing countries. There is also little reason to 
believe that the level of concentration will decline significantly in the foreseeable future. On 
the contrary, in a globalizing world with low trade and investment barriers, there may be strong 
economic reasons for TNCs to centralise production and R&D bases in a few sites to reap 
economies of scale, scope and agglomeration. Countries far from centres of activity, and with 
low technological capabilities,  may continue to be marginalised to most TNC activities 
(marketing and resource procurement apart). The strengthening of IPRs may actually reinforce 
the tendency to concentrate high value functions in a few efficient, well-located sites, making it 
easier to use these to sell to other countries. This may imply that these other countries would, 
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Table 5: Technology and industrial performance indices combined – the domestic 
capabilities index 

















1  Japan  0.8649  0.6964  0.7806  41  Romania  0.0015  0.0954  0.0484 
2  Switzerlan
d 
0.7858  0.7512  0.7685  42  Bahrain  0.0024  0.0891  0.0458 
3  USA  0.7709  0.5641  0.6675  43  Uruguay  0.0020  0.0867  0.0444 
4  Sweden  0.5957  0.5622  0.5789  44  Russian 
Fed 
0.0062  0.0774  0.0418 
5  Singapore  0.1738  0.8832  0.5285  45  Tunisia  0.0002  0.0676  0.0339 
6  Germany  0.4151  0.6320  0.5235  46  Venezuela  0.0033  0.0597  0.0315 
7  Finland  0.4099  0.5381  0.4740  47  Chile  0.0047  0.0557  0.0302 
8  Ireland  0.1191  0.7392  0.4292  48  Guatemala  0.0003  0.0557  0.0280 
9  Denmark  0.3434  0.4430  0.3932  49  Indonesia  0.0005  0.0543  0.0274 
10  Belgium  0.2645  0.4949  0.3797  50  India  0.0004  0.0539  0.0272 
11  France  0.2716  0.4650  0.3683  51  Zimbabwe  0.0000  0.0517  0.0259 
12  Taiwan  0.3173  0.4123  0.3648  52  El Salvador  0.0000  0.0507  0.0254 
13  Netherland
s 
0.2743  0.4287  0.3515  53  Morocco  0.0002  0.0476  0.0239 
14  UK  0.1926  0.4725  0.3326  54  Saudi 
Arabia 
0.0009  0.0467  0.0238 
15  Canada  0.2488  0.4072  0.3280  55  Colombia  0.0004  0.0413  0.0208 
16  Austria  0.2022  0.4528  0.3275  56  Mauritius  0.0002  0.0405  0.0204 
17  S Korea  0.2225  0.3700  0.2962  57  Egypt  0.0001  0.0381  0.0191 
18  Israel  0.2712  0.3014  0.2863  58  Peru  0.0001  0.0348  0.0174 
19  Norway  0.2344  0.3005  0.2675  59  Oman  0.0000  0.0320  0.0160 
20  Italy  0.0986  0.3844  0.2415  60  Pakistan  0.0000  0.0312  0.0156 
21  Spain  0.0431  0.3194  0.1813  61  Ecuador  0.0009  0.0251  0.0130 
22  Australia  0.1470  0.2113  0.1792  62  Jordan  0.0008  0.0241  0.0124 
23  H Kong  0.0829  0.2041  0.1435  63  Kenya  0.0001  0.0246  0.0124 
24  Malaysia  0.0065  0.2783  0.1424  64  Honduras  0.0003  0.0231  0.0117 
25  Slovenia  0.0541  0.2210  0.1376  65  Panama  0.0008  0.0221  0.0114 
26  N Zealand  0.0835  0.1861  0.1348  66  Jamaica  0.0006  0.0222  0.0114 
27  Czech 
Republic 
0.0200  0.2426  0.1313  67  Bolivia  0.0002  0.0214  0.0108 
28  Hungary  0.0135  0.2392  0.1263  68  Albania  0.0000  0.0214  0.0107 
29  Portugal  0.0096  0.2399  0.1247  69  Sri Lanka  0.0002  0.0174  0.0088 
30  Mexico  0.0022  0.2457  0.1240  70  Nicaragua  0.0001  0.0169  0.0085 
31  Philippines  0.0006  0.2411  0.1209  71  Paraguay  0.0000  0.0151  0.0076 
32  Thailand  0.0005  0.1721  0.0863  72  Mozambiq
ue 
0.0000  0.0129  0.0064 
33  Brazil  0.0087  0.1491  0.0789  73  Bangladesh  0.0000  0.0109  0.0054 
34  Poland  0.0055  0.1434  0.0745  74  Algeria  0.0001  0.0092  0.0047 
35  Argentina  0.0067  0.1395  0.0731  75  Cameroon  0.0000  0.0076  0.0038 
36  C Rica  0.0041  0.1294  0.0667  76  Senegal  0.0000  0.0076  0.0038 
37  China  0.0006  0.1256  0.0631  77  Zambia  0.0000  0.0066  0.0033 
38  S Africa  0.0121  0.1075  0.0598  78  Nigeria  0.0000  0.0062  0.0031 
39  Greece  0.0103  0.1023  0.0563  79  Nepal  0.0000  0.0062  0.0031 QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS85   Page 23 
   
40  Turkey  0.0029  0.1080  0.0555  80  Tanzania  0.0000  0.0047  0.0024 
          81  Malawi  0.0000  0.0033  0.0017 
          82  Madagasca
r 
0.0000  0.0033  0.0017 
          83  CAR  0.0000  0.0031  0.0015 
          84  Uganda  0.0000  0.0028  0.0014 
          85  Yemen  0.0000  0.0014  0.0007 
          86  Ghana  0.0000  0.0008  0.0004 
          87  Ethiopia  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Let us now combine the technology and industrial performance indices to derive a 
combined index, an indicator of overall ‘domestic capabilities’. Table 5 shows the three 
indices, with countries ranked by the combined capability index. Countries are now divided 
into five groups. The implications are very similar to those drawn earlier and need not be 
repeated.  
3.3 TECHNOLOGY IMPORTS: FDI, LICENSING AND CAPITAL GOODS 
Table 6 shows the average values of FDI inflows and licensing payments overseas by the four 
groups of countries, and Table 7 gives the values of  the individual countries ranked by the 
technology effort index.
15 Capital goods imports are shown separately below.  
























1. High   503.88  8.87  10.0%  2.1%  170.99  2,582.76  0.798% 
2. Moderate   103.15  2.59  9.2%  2.2%  14.42  378.05  0.280% 
3. Low   34.21  2.40  8.9%  2.2%  2.79  150.03  0.203% 
4. Negligible   7.94  0.14  7.5%  1.3%  0.13  2.66  0.028% 
Source: Calculated from UNCTAD WIR  (various), IMF, World Bank and various 
national statistical sources. 
Note: GDI stands for gross domestic investment.  
It appears that on average, both FDI and foreign licensing in per capita terms decline with 
the intensity of national technological effort. This is also true of FDI as a percentage of gross 
domestic investment and licensing as a percentage of GNP, but not of FDI as a percentage of 
GNP. At the country level, however, the correlation between the technology effort and 
technology import variables is less strong or absent. For instance, FDI per capita is positively 
related to the technology index, but not very strongly (coefficient of 0.31), while royalty 
payments per capita are insignificant (coefficient of 0.11). When expressed as percentages of 
GNP the correlation is even lower (-0.11 for FDI and 0.01 for royalties).  
                                                 
15 Licensing payments are taken from published national balance of payments statistics (from the IMF and national 
sources), and cover all types of royalty and technical fees paid abroad, as well as payments for trademarks and possibly 
consultancy services. Some countries do not break down their invisible payments overseas in detail; for these we estimated 
the figures based on proportions of service payments accounted for by licensing payments in other countries at similar levels 
of development and with similar trade and FDI policies.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS85   Page 24 
   
A moment’s reflection would suggest that the lack of correlation between technology 
effort and technology imports is not surprising. There is no a priori reason to expect that 
countries that do more R&D would also receive larger amounts of FDI relative to their 
economic size or spend more on foreign technology than other countries. In some cases, there 
is good reason to expect the opposite – a strong technology base may lead to more outward 
rather than inward FDI relative to GNP and to greater royalty receipts than payments. In other 
cases, strong FDI inflows and royalty payments may go with a weak local technology base. 
This gives rise to a fairly random pattern that is reflected in the national figures and 
correlations. 
 
Table 7: Inward FDI and technology licensing payments overseas by technology groups 









As % of 
GDI 







As % of 
GNP 
1  Japan  7.1  1.07  0.07  0.02  70.8  8,947.30  0.219 
2  Switzerland  529.8  4.47  6.6  1.37  151.7  1,078.20  0.38 
3  USA  271.3  70  5.67  0.99  41.8  11,292  0.143 
4  Sweden  922.5  8.1  25.25  3.66  106  938.5  0.414 
5  Germany  77.1  6.81  1.32  0.28  59.6  4,893.40  0.224 
6  Finland  260.2  1.46  7.57  1.21  79.8  411.4  0.329 
7  Denmark  551.8  2.99  9.6  1.78  8.5  45.3  0.026 
8  Taiwan  74.5  1.74  2.78  0.66  65  1,419.00  0.527 
9  Netherlands  711.6  11.92  15.5  3.01  188.8  2,964.50  0.762 
10  France  362.1  22.89  8.59  1.49  46.2  2,716.70  0.185 
11  Israel  191.1  1.11  5.08  1.22  35.2  209.6  0.217 
12  Belgium  1,116.2  10.58  24.16  3.91  107.7  1,099.20  0.424 
13  Canada  292.8  8.06  8.08  1.49  68.4  2,073.20  0.357 
14  Norway  589.3  2.62  7.73  1.81  76.9  341  0.224 
15  S Korea  36.8  1.61  0.99  0.36  51  2,369.30  0.594 
16  Austria  304.6  2.65  4.8  1.15  100.4  810.9  0.374 
17  UK  367.6  20.91  12.07  1.9  103.7  6,122.70  0.484 
18  Singapore  2,536.0  8.2  26.54  9.57  559.2  1,769.00  1.852 
19  Australia  376.9  6.35  8.82  1.88  53.8  1,009.70  0.261 
20  Ireland  484.2  1.47  15.11  2.64  1,683.1  6,235.80  8.998 
21  Italy  63  3.55  1.9  0.33  20.1  1,154.90  0.1 
22  N Zealand  735  2.69  22.31  4.79  70.4  266.9  0.482 
23  H Kong  727.7  2.75  10.24  1.96  184.7  1,235.00  0.781 
  Average 
Group 1 
503.88  8.87  10.0%  2.1%  170.99  2,582.76  0.798 
24  Slovenia  92.9  0.21  4.88  1.09  19.5  38.6  0.199 
25  Spain  182.3  7.65  6.77  1.38  47.4  1,866.30  0.336 
26  Czech 
Republic 
132.1  1.3  8.58  2.77  10.9  112.6  0.213 
27  Hungary  236.1  2.39  23.57  5.58  21.2  214.6  0.47 
28  S Africa  37.1  1.33  6.28  1.01  4  165.4  0.121 
29  Greece  96.7  1.08  4.81  0.93  5.5  58  0.047 QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS85   Page 25 
   
30  Portugal  149  1.53  6.32  1.54  29.1  290  0.273 
31  Brazil  49.6  7.28  5.06  1.08  6.5  1,075.00  0.14 
32  Argentina  149.1  5.39  10.34  1.94  11.7  422  0.145 
33  Malaysia  229.5  4.63  14.1  5.73  107.8  2,392.00  2.942 
34  Russian Fed  15.4  1.98  2.52  0.56  Neg.  2  0.001 
35  Poland  86.3  3.13  13.27  2.65  5  195  0.129 
36  Chile  229.4  3.38  20.23  5.26  3.8  56  0.076 
37  C Rica  110.4  0.37  15.94  4.18  6.1  21.5  0.219 
38  Venezuela  88.4  1.89  15.05  2.53  Neg.  Neg.  Neg. 
39  Turkey  12  0.74  1.76  0.43  1.9  124  0.062 
40  Bahrain  1.7  0.01  0.76  0.14  Neg.  Neg.  Neg. 
41  Mexico  102.4  6.81  11.04  2.49  5.2  501  0.136 
42  Uruguay  42  0.14  6.1  0.81  1.8  6  0.03 
43  Romania  20.6  0.51  6.21  1.44  0.9  21  0.069 
  Average 
Group 2  103.15  2.59  9.2%  2.2%  14.42  378.05  0.280 
44  S Arabia  13.8  0.42  1  0.33  Neg.  Neg.  Neg. 
45  Ecuador  46.3  0.51  15.75  3.04  5.6  68  0.37 
46  Panama  189  0.46  20.74  6.13  6.4  17.6  0.212 
47  Jordan  16.1  0.07  3.84  1.01  Neg.  Neg.  Neg. 
48  China  30.1  37.81  13.54  5.51  0.3  420  0.045 
49  Jamaica  58.7  0.14  10.59  3.63  11.6  30  0.667 
50  Philippines  20.1  1.54  8.46  2.01  2.1  158  0.2 
51  Indonesia  19.8  3.66  6.16  1.9  4.9  1,002.00  0.767 
52  Thailand  38  2.45  4.07  1.48  13.1  804  0.61 
53  Colombia  62.2  1.98  11.29  2.54  1.3  54  0.054 
54  India  2.1  1.64  2.16  0.51  0.2  200.8  0.047 
55  Guatemala  9  0.09  4.2  0.64  Neg.  Neg.  Neg. 
56  Honduras  11.2  0.06  4.92  1.57  0.8  5.1  0.111 
57  S Lanka  10.6  0.19  5.91  1.49  Neg.  Neg.  Neg. 
58  Bolivia  49.5  0.3  30.89  5.22  0.6  5.2  0.065 
59  Mauritius  25.7  0.03  2.65  0.74  Neg.  Neg.  Neg. 
60  Morocco  19.4  0.51  7.72  1.63  6.2  171.5  0.498 
61  Tunisia  41.2  0.38  8.39  2.22  0.2  2.6  0.014 
62  Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
13.3  0.78  7.83  1.32  6.4  392  0.495 
63  Peru  91.1  2.2  16.91  3.85  3.2  80  0.132 
64  Algeria  0.4  0.01  0.07  0.02  Neg.  Neg.  Neg. 
65  Nicaragua  18.8  0.07  16.79  4.5  Neg.  Neg.  Neg. 
66  Kenya  0.5  0.01  0.92  0.15  1.3  39.9  0.391 
  Average 
Group 3  34.21  2.40  8.9%  2.2%  2.79  150.03  0.203 
-  Nigeria  13.5  1.23  30.72  5.36  Neg.  Neg.  Neg. 
-  Pakistan  5.1  0.65  5.66  1.06  0.1  19.7  0.032 
-  Albania  19.7  0.08  20.24  3.15  Neg.  Neg.  Neg. 
-  Bangladesh  0.3  0.03  0.44  0.09  Neg.  5.1  0.012 
-  Cameroon  1.2  0.01  1.13  0.18  0.1  1  0.012 
-  CAR  0.4  Neg.  3.02  0.2  Neg.  Neg.  Neg. 
-  El Salvador  2.1  0.01  0.71  0.14  1.1  6.9  0.061 
-  Ethiopia  0.1  0.01  0.58  0.09  Neg.  Neg.  Neg. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS85   Page 26 
   
-  Ghana  7.9  0.13  9.73  2.19  Neg.  Neg.  Neg. 
-  Madagascar  0.8  0.01  2.81  0.32  0.6  9.8  0.264 
-  Malawi  0.1  Neg.  0.34  0.06  Neg.  Neg.  Neg. 
-  Mozambiqu
e 
3.1  0.02  10.24  1.88  Neg.  Neg.  Neg. 
-  Nepal  0.6  0.01  1.18  0.28  Neg.  Neg.  Neg. 
-  Oman  37.3  0.07  3.43  0.63  Neg.  Neg.  Neg. 
-  Paraguay  40.6  0.2  9.93  2.27  0.1  0.5  0.006 
-  Senegal  6.6  0.06  7.58  1.34  0.2  2.2  0.047 
-  Tanzania  3.3  0.09  9.2  1.77  0.1  4.7  0.065 
-  Uganda  5.8  0.12  13.8  2.16  Neg.  Neg.  Neg. 
-  Yemen  7.3  0.14  12.03  2.11  Neg.  Neg.  Neg. 
-  Zambia  6.7  0.06  12.18  1.75  Neg.  Neg.  Neg. 
-  Zimbabwe  4.2  0.04  3.06  0.61  0.5  6  0.084 
  Average 
Group 4  7.94  0.14  7.5%  1.3%  0.13  2.66  0.028 
This reinforces the conclusion that countries will face different outcomes from 
strengthening IPRs, not just at different levels of development but also even at similar levels of 
income, depending on their pattern of technology development and imports. It may, of course, 
be argued that all countries should in the future be more receptive to FDI and licensing and that 
stronger IPRs will (if we accept the Maskus reasoning) promote both. In fact, countries with 
exceptionally low levels of technology inflows should make special efforts to raise them. More 
evidence is needed, however, before we can say with certainty that FDI and licensing respond 
positively to IPRs. As noted above, ‘the jury is still out’ in these matters.  
Let us now consider technology imports in the form of capital goods. These are shown in 
Table 8, with countries again ranked by the technology effort index. The pattern is very similar 
to other forms of technology imports: group averages change in line with the technology index, 
but with large variations between individual countries. Much of the variation has to do with the 
size of the economy (apart, obviously, from the level of development), with larger countries 
less dependent on imported equipment than smaller ones.  
Table 8: Capital goods imports per capita (average 1995-98, current dollars) 
Group 1  Group 2  Group 3  Group 4 
Japan  305.98  Slovenia  741.28  Saudi Arabia  153.95  Nicaragua  47.07 
Switzerland 1,905.21  Spain  468.31  Ecuador  84.11  Peru  77.97 
USA  570.36  Czech 
Republic 
529.98  Jordan  107.72  Albania  24.38 
Sweden  1,337.17  Hungary  313.68  Panama  166.68  Bangladesh  5.85 
Germany  796.17  S Africa  168.91  China  25.02  Cameroon  9.62 
Finland  1,090.87  Greece  434.90  Jamaica  139.49  CAR  12.59 
Denmark  1,439.22  Portugal  498.04  Philippines  65.93  El Salvador  71.26 
Taiwan  992.28  Brazil  76.26  Indonesia  43.16  Ethiopia  3.29 
Netherland
s 
1,784.49  Argentina  191.58  Thailand  209.67  Ghana  0.01 
France  745.41  Malaysia  716.81  Colombia  92.45  Madagascar  6.28 
Israel  871.98  Russian Fed  55.12  India  4.50  Malawi  7.38 
Belgium  1,694.51  Poland  191.37  Guatemala  63.68  Mozambique  8.18 
Canada  1,221.36  Chile  323.19  Honduras  68.31  Nepal  3.02 
Norway  1,800.96  C Rica  191.27  Bolivia  73.65  Nigeria  10.14 QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS85   Page 27 
   
S Korea  534.74  Venezuela  123.46  Mauritius  258.89  Oman  228.50 
Austria  1,366.98  Turkey  162.09  Morocco  41.01  Pakistan  11.28 
UK  858.41  Bahrain  244.61  Sri Lanka  13.71  Paraguay  133.69 
Singapore  8,803.54  Mexico  178.05  Tunisia  130.33  Senegal  8.35 
Australia  836.07  Uruguay  198.38  Algeria  43.20  Tanzania  8.43 
Ireland  2,179.62  Romania  78.40  Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
34.11  Uganda  0.00 
Italy  486.72      Kenya  22.11  Yemen  5.80 
N Zealand  815.89          Zambia  11.16 
H Kong  4,599.10          Zimbabwe  62.18 
Average   1,610.31    294.28    87.70    32.89 
Source: Calculated from UN Comtrade database.  
The three forms of technology imports can be combined into a composite technology 
import index (Table 9). This index has some correlation with the domestic capability index 
(coefficient of 0.56), but there are many individual differences in ranking for reasons noted 
above. For instance, India ranks low in the technology import index but does better on the 
domestic capability index.  
Table 9: Technology import index 
Singapore  0.777
4 
Germany  0.0521  Oman  0.0135  Guatemala  0.0036 
Ireland  0.479
5 
Spain  0.0511  Uruguay  0.0134  Albania  0.0035 
H Kong  0.306
4 
Hungary  0.0471  Mauritius  0.0132  El Salvador  0.0032 
Belgium  0.232
2 
Portugal  0.0442  S Africa  0.0121  Zimbabwe  0.0030 
Netherlands  0.198
5 
Slovenia  0.0441  Colombia  0.0119  Nigeria  0.0021 
Sweden  0.192
9 





0.0396  Paraguay  0.0104  Algeria  0.0017 
Norway  0.160
9 
S Korea  0.0352  Tunisia  0.0104  Zambia  0.0013 
N Zealand  0.141
4 
Panama  0.0324  Ecuador  0.0104  Senegal  0.0012 
Denmark  0.128
7 
Italy  0.0307  Bahrain  0.0095  Yemen  0.0012 
Austria  0.111
7 
Greece  0.0303  Bolivia  0.0094  Kenya  0.0011 
UK  0.101
3 
Argentina  0.0292  Turkey  0.0081  Pakistan  0.0011 
Canada  0.098
3 
Japan  0.0265  Saudi Arabia  0.0076  Ghana  0.0010 
Australia  0.091
8 
C Rica  0.0229  Jordan  0.0062  Tanzania  0.0008 
Finland  0.091
3 
Mexico  0.0212  Romania  0.0058  Uganda  0.0007 
France  0.085 Poland  0.0196  Philippines  0.0055  Mozambique  0.0007 QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS85   Page 28 




Venezuela  0.0163  Morocco  0.0053  Cameroon  0.0005 
USA  0.065
5 
Peru  0.0155  Indonesia  0.0052  CAR  0.0005 
Israel  0.065
1 
Thailand  0.0155  China  0.0049  India  0.0005 
Taiwan  0.060
2 
Jamaica  0.0153  Egypt  0.0043  Madagascar  0.0004 
        Nicaragua  0.0042  Malawi  0.0003 
        Honduras  0.0042  Bangladesh  0.0002 
        Russian Fed  0.0041  Nepal  0.0002 
            Ethiopia  0.0001 
The countries in Table 9 are ranked according to the technology import index, and divided 
into four groups. There are a relatively large number of countries with very low use of foreign 
technology. The implications for IPRs are, as before, mixed. Countries with relatively high 
reliance on foreign technologies may need to strengthen IPRs to ensure continued access (if at 
higher prices), particularly for advanced proprietary technologies and high-tech capital goods. 
For other countries, with a need for more mature equipment, stronger IPRs would bring no 
benefit.  
3.4 SKILLS AND ICT INFRASTRUCTURE  
Let us end with national figures on technical skills and modern (information and 
communication, ICT) infrastructure. Technical skills are measured here by  technical 
enrolments at the tertiary level in pure science, engineering and mathematics and computing. 
This measure is, however, strongly correlated with other measures like years of schooling, so 
the choice of skill indicators does not matter greatly. ICT is measured by telephone mainlines, 
which is also highly correlated with other ICT indicators like mobile telephones, personal 
computers and Internet servers. The picture is very similar to that yielded by other indices of 
technological effort and industrial performance (Table 10).  
Table 10: Tertiary technical enrolments and telephone mainlines (1997-98) 
  Tertiary Technical Enrolment  Telephone Mainlines 








1  S Korea  1.65%  742.5  Switzerland  675.4  4,799.30 
2  Finland  1.33%  68  Sweden  673.7  5,963.30 
3  Russian 
Fed 
1.18%  1,749.20  USA  661.3  178,751.00 
4  Australia  1.17%  212  Norway  660.1  2,925.70 
5  Taiwan  1.06%  226.8  Denmark  659.7  3,497.00 
6  Spain  0.97%  379.7  Canada  633.9  19,206.00 
7  Ireland  0.91%  32.6  Netherlands  593.1  9,310.60 
8  Austria  0.78%  63  France  569.7  33,524.00 
9  Germany  0.77%  631.1  Germany  566.8  46,505.00 
10  UK  0.75%  439.1  Singapore  562  1,777.90 
11  Sweden  0.73%  64.5  H Kong  557.7  3,729.20 
12  Portugal  0.73%  72.6  UK  556.9  32,889.00 
13  Chile  0.73%  103.1  Finland  553.9  2,854.50 QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS85   Page 29 
   
14  Greece  0.72%  75  Greece  522.2  5,491.10 
15  Canada  0.69%  203.2  Australia  512.1  9,601.40 
16  USA  0.68%  1,792.90  Japan  502.7  63,540.00 
17  N Zealand  0.68%  24.8  Belgium  500.3  5,104.60 
18  Israel  0.68%  37.4  Austria  491  3,966.10 
19  Norway  0.67%  29.3  N Zealand  479.1  1,816.80 
20  Japan  0.64%  808.2  Israel  471.1  2,809.10 
21  Italy  0.64%  364  Italy  450.7  25,954.00 
22  France  0.61%  355.1  Ireland  434.7  1,610.40 
23  Denmark  0.60%  31.4  S Korea  432.7  20,088.00 
24  Panama  0.59%  15.6  Taiwan  420.1  9,174.80 
25  Netherland
s 
0.56%  86.6  Spain  413.7  16,288.00 
26  Philippines  0.55%  387.3  Portugal  413.5  4,121.40 
27  Bahrain  0.52%  3  Slovenia  374.8  742.9 
28  Switzerlan
d 
0.51%  36  Czech Republic  363.9  3,746.20 
29  Colombia  0.51%  197.1  Hungary  335.9  3,396.80 
30  Slovenia  0.49%  9.7  Turkey  254.1  16,125.00 
31  Romania  0.49%  111.2  Uruguay  250.4  823.5 
32  H Kong  0.49%  30.2  Bahrain  245.5  157.8 
33  Singapore  0.47%  14.1  Poland  227.6  8,800.40 
34  Argentina  0.47%  162.3  Mauritius  213.7  247.8 
35  Peru  0.46%  108.2  Chile  205.5  3,045.80 
36  Czech 
Republic 
0.46%  47.9  Argentina  202.7  7,323.60 
37  Venezuela  0.45%  97.9  Malaysia  197.6  4,383.70 
38  Mexico  0.44%  400.1  Russian Fed  196.6  28,879.00 
39  Belgium  0.43%  43.6  Colombia  173.5  7,078.70 
40  Jordan  0.42%  17.5  C Rica  171.8  605.9 
41  Algeria  0.41%  115.1  Jamaica  165.7  426.8 
42  Poland  0.39%  151.9  Romania  162.4  3,653.40 
43  C Rica  0.34%  11.5  Panama  151.3  418.3 
44  Bolivia  0.34%  25.4  S Arabia  142.6  2,957.80 
45  Turkey  0.33%  198.3  Brazil  120.5  19,989.00 
46  Uruguay  0.29%  9.3  Venezuela  116.7  2,712.00 
47  Ecuador  0.29%  32.7  S Africa  114.6  4,743.00 
48  El Salvador  0.26%  15  Mexico  103.6  9,928.70 
49  Morocco  0.25%  66.7  Oman  92.3  212.6 
50  Tunisia  0.24%  21.4  Jordan  85.5  390.2 
51  Indonesia  0.23%  439.1  Thailand  83.5  5,112.80 
52  Nicaragua  0.22%  9.7  Tunisia  80.6  752.2 
53  Honduras  0.20%  11.3  El Salvador  80  484.7 
54  Thailand  0.19%  110.5  Ecuador  78.3  953 
55  Brazil  0.18%  289.3  China  69.6  86,230.00 
56  S Africa  0.17%  68.1  Bolivia  68.8  547.1 
57  Guatemala  0.17%  17  Peru  66.7  1,654.80 
58  Hungary  0.16%  16.7  Egypt, Arab Rep.  60.2  3,696.10 
59  Malaysia  0.13%  26.7  Paraguay  55.3  288.4 
60  S Arabia  0.12%  23.4  Morocco  54.4  1,509.90 QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS85   Page 30 
   
61  India  0.12%  1,086.30  Algeria  53.2  1,591.50 
62  Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
0.12%  69.6  Guatemala  40.8  441.1 
63  Paraguay  0.11%  5.5  Honduras  38.1  234.8 
64  Jamaica  0.11%  2.9  Philippines  37  2,782.60 
65  Albania  0.11%  3.6  Nicaragua  31.3  150.3 
66  China  0.10%  1,221.00  Albania  30.5  101.9 
-  Zimbabwe  0.09%  9.5  S Lanka  28.4  532.7 
-  S Lanka  0.08%  15.4  Indonesia  27  5,499.90 
-  Nepal  0.08%  16  India  22  21,538.00 
-  Bangladesh  0.08%  90  Pakistan  19.4  2,549.80 
-  Nigeria  0.06%  63.3  Zimbabwe  17.3  201.6 
-  Madagasca
r 
0.06%  8.2  Senegal  15.5  140.1 
-  Cameroon  0.06%  8.4  Yemen  13.4  221.9 
-  Senegal  0.05%  4.4  Kenya  9.2  269.9 
-  Pakistan  0.05%  63.4  Zambia  8.8  85.5 
-  Oman  0.04%  0.9  Nepal  8.5  194 
-  Mauritius  0.04%  0.5  Ghana  7.5  138.9 
-  Zambia  0.03%  2.7  Cameroon  5.4  77.2 
-  Yemen  0.02%  3.2  Mozambique  4  67.6 
-  Kenya  0.02%  4.6  Nigeria  3.8  462.1 
-  CAR  0.01%  0.4  Tanzania  3.8  121.9 
-  Uganda  0.01%  2.5  Malawi  3.5  36.6 
-  Tanzania  0.01%  3.6  Bangladesh  3  380.6 
-  Mozambiq
ue 
0.01%  2.1  Madagascar  2.9  42.1 
-  Malawi  0.01%  0.8  Ethiopia  2.8  168.6 
-  Ghana  0.01%  2.1  Uganda  2.8  57.9 
-  Ethiopia  0.01%  6.5  CAR  2.7  9.5 
4. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
This review has illustrated the significant variations both between rich and poor countries and 
within the developing world itself in the variables that may affect the technological impact of 
TRIPS: domestic technical effort, imports of foreign technology and industrial performance. It 
has sought to put empirical flesh and bones on the intuition that different countries may face 
different outcomes by strengthening their IPR regimes, but without trying to measure what the 
costs and benefits might be. It has noted that costs and benefits are difficult to quantify, since 
the result depends on several complex factors, some of which are not open to assessment on the 
basis of past evidence. In a dynamic world, a certain amount of subjectivity – even crystal ball 
gazing – may be inevitable.   
We concur with the World Bank (2001) that the application of TRIPS should take account 
of national economic and technological differences. The World Bank conducts a similar 
exercise to the one attempted here, and divides countries into three groups based only incomes 
– low, middle and high – and ‘lists IPR standards that are likely to be most appropriate for each 
group’ (p. 140). It suggests that even as it stands, TRIPS ‘contains considerable flexibility in 
implementing and enforcing standards that are conducive to development’ (139). It 
recommends that this flexibility be fully exploited to encourage development and allow longer 
periods for adjustment. This is certainly the right approach; we cannot, however, assess how QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS85   Page 31 
   
far it should be taken and whether it will be sufficient to meet the technology development 
needs of poorer countries. It is quite possible that more action may be needed, calling for an 
examination of the TRIPS provisions per se.  
For instance, investigation may focus on measuring, even roughly, the immediate effects 
of TRIPS in terms of the higher costs of technology and capital goods and the restriction of 
imitation and reverse engineering as a source of technological learning. It is also necessary to 
investigate the real impact of stricter IPRs on promoting technology inflows: cross-country 
econometric analysis is not the most reliable instrument for doing this. It may conceal more 
than it reveals, and it certainly does not show the strong inter-industry differences in the 
propensity to rely on IPRs for innovation or technology transfer. It also confuses the signalling 
effect of IPRs with that of other policies. If a positive effect of IPRs on technology transfer to 
the poorest segment of countries is actually found, it is important to assess if these gains 
outweigh, in present value terms, the more immediate costs.  
If it is found, as is quite likely, that the present value of the benefits of TRIPS does not 
outweigh its costs for many poor countries, the other arguments for accepting TRIPS should be 
clearly stated. As noted, there may well be such arguments, but they should be presented 
clearly and not conflated with those based on economic benefits of stronger IPRs.  
A final word of caution: it is not possible to pick the countries that will lose or gain from 
TRIPS from the above indices. Their use lies mainly in illustrating just how wide the 
differences are between developing countries in practically every aspect of technological and 
industrial performance. To the extent that there are theoretical grounds to expect the economic 
impact of TRIPS to vary on these grounds, the data provide some signposts for further 
investigation. They do not presume to do more.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS85   Page 32 
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ANNEXES 





LOW TECHNOLOGY  
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036 SHELL FISH 
FRESH,FROZEN 
041 WHEAT ETC 
UNMILLED 
042 RICE 
043 BARLEY UNMILLED 
044 MAIZE UNMILLED 
045 CEREALS NES 
UNMILLED 





071 COFFEE AND 
SUBSTITUTES 
072 COCOA 
074 TEA AND MATE 
075 SPICES 
081 FEEDING STUFF FOR 
ANIMLS 





























024 CHEESE AND CURD 
035 FISH 
SALTED,DRIED,SMOKED 
037 FISH ETC 
PREPD,PRSVD NES 
046 WHEAT ETC MEAL OR 
FLOUR 
047 OTHER CEREAL 
MEALS,FLOUR 
048 CEREAL ETC 
PREPARATIONS 




061 SUGAR AND HONEY 
062 SUGAR CANDY NON-
CHOCLATE 


















251 PULP AND WASTE 
PAPER 
264 JUTE,OTH TEX BAST 
FIBRES 
265 VEG FIBRE,EXCL 
COTN,JUTE 
269 WASTE OF TEXTILE 
FABRICS 
423 FIXED VEG OILS,SOFT 
424 FIXED VEG OIL 
NONSOFT 







612 LEATHER ETC 
MANUFACTURES 
613 FUR SKINS 
TANNED,DRESSED 
651 TEXTILE YARN 
652 COTTON 
FABRICS,WOVEN 







657 SPECIAL TXTL 
FABRC,PRODS 










844 UNDER GARMENTS 
NOT KNIT 
845 OUTERWEAR KNIT 
NONELASTC 
846 UNDER GARMENTS 
KNITTED 

















675 IRON,STEEL QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS85   Page 3 




MT 1: AUTOMOTIVE 
781 PASS MOTOR VEH 
EXC BUSES 
782 LORRIES,SPCL MTR 
VEH NES 
783 ROAD MOTOR 
VEHICLES NES 
784 MOTOR VEH 
PRTS,ACCES NES 
785 CYCLES,ETC MOTRZD 
OR NOT  
 
MT 2: PROCESS 
266 SYNTHETIC FIBRES 
TO SPIN 






























598 MISCEL CHEM 
PRODUCTS NES 
653 WOVN MAN-MADE 
FIB FABRIC 
671 PIG IRON ETC. 
672 IRON,STEEL 
PRIMARY FORMS 
MT 3: ENGINEERING 
 
711 STEAM BOILERS & 
AUX PLNT 
713 INTRNL COMBUS 
PSTN ENGIN 
714 ENGINES AND 
MOTORS NES 












727 FOOD MACHRY NON-
DOMESTIC 
















749 NONELEC MACH 
PTS,ACC NES 








775 HOUSEHOLD TYPE 
EQUIP NES 





HIGH TECHNOLOGY  
MANUFACTURES  
HT 1: ELECTRONIC AND 
ELECTRICAL 
 
716 ROTATING ELECTRIC 
PLANT 
718 OTH POWER 
GENERATG MACHY 
751 OFFICE MACHINES 
752 AUTOMTIC DATA 
PROC EQUIP 















HT 2: OTHER 
 













APPARAT,EQUIPT NES QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS85   Page 4 
   
     
Note: Excludes ‘special transactions’ like electric current, cinema film, printed matter, 
special transactions, gold, works of art, coins, pets. 
 
 